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But Were They Talking about Emotions? Affectus, affectio and the History of Emotions 
 
It is well recognized that a history of emotions must account for the fact that the term 
‘emotions’ is itself a modern construction.1 The question arises then, if medieval and early 
modern people talked about a concept that is recognizably similar to our ‘emotions’ (although 
this itself may be in dispute), what terminology did they use to describe these affective states 
that were partly volitional, partly cognitive, and (for some at least) necessarily physiological? 
Attention has centred on the Latin terms affectus (pl. affectūs) and affectio (pl. affectiones), not 
least because of the emotions connotations of their modern vernacular cognates ‘Affekt’, 
‘affect’, ‘affection’, and so forth. As Damien Boquet and Piroska Nagy have revealed, this 
modern usage is the outcome of deliberate terminological choices made by authors discussing 
emotions from Spinoza through Kant and Freud to Foucault.2  
It is tempting, therefore, for emotions researchers to focus on the terms affectus and 
affectio when searching for premodern Latinate discussions of ‘emotions’, but this will only 
offer accurate insights into the history of emotions if we have first clarified the nuances that 
could have been communicated by these terms.3 These nuances could vary according to genre, 
popular moral norms, changing philosophical positions—including the growing impact of 
Christian theology on philosophy in late antiquity and the Middle Ages and the renewed impact 
of Aristotle on Christianized philosophy in the High Middle Ages—as well as the individual 
emphases of particular authors, which were shaped by the complex, layered, and inconsistent 
traditions of earlier usages. Indeed, tradition itself did not guarantee stability of definition: later 
writers necessarily viewed the theoretical work of their forebears through the lens of more 
recent developments in science and medicine; others might claim consonance with earlier 
                                                     
1 T. DIXON, From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category, Cambridge 2003, esp. cap. 
4; IDEM., ‘Emotion’: The History of a Keyword in Crisis, Emotion Review, 4, 2012, pp. 338–344. 
2 D. BOQUET and P. NAGY, Pour une histoire des émotions: L’historien face aux questions contemporaines, in Le sujet 
des émotions au moyen âge, ed. IDEM, Paris 2008, pp. 15-51 (p. 25).  
3 For the philological approach of ‘word histories’, see N. KENNY, Curiosity in Early Modern Europe: Word Histories, 
Wiesbaden 1998; I. MAC CARTHY, Renaissance Keywords, London 2013. It is important that researchers not simply 
assume at the outset an identity between affectus / affectiones and ‘emotions’; for example, see I. VAN ’T SPIJKER, 
Exegesis and Emotion: Richard of St Victor’s De quatuor gradibus violentae caritatis, Sacris erudiri, 36, 1996, pp. 
147-160 (p. 147) and Ad commovendos affectus: Exegesis and the Affects in Hugh of Saint Victor, in Bibel und 
Exegese in der Abtei Sankt Viktor zu Paris: Form und Funktion eines Grundtextes im europäischen Rahmen, ed. R. 
BERNDT, Münster 2009, pp. 215-234 (pp. 215, 219).  
authorities while travelling a different definitional trajectory entirely. These considerations 
should make it clear that no simple account can pin down the meaning of such polyvalent terms 
as affectus and affectio: there is no substitute for close reading of these terms in their specific 
context.  
Several considerations that impact on the contextual meanings of the terms recur 
throughout their premodern history. Perhaps the primary of these is the semantic relationship 
between the them. Are affectus and affectio synonyms, or do they signify distinctly? An 
assumption of synonymity has been common amongst modern emotions researchers and 
lexicographers, not least because the usage of key premodern authorities, such as Augustine, 
can be read as tending in that direction.4 Such a reading may not hold, however, across 
different periods and contexts. We might find, for instance, that a certain overlap between the 
terms in the classical and patristic eras yields to increased definitional rigour (though not 
necessarily consistency) in the Middle Ages, before the interchangeability of the terms is 
reasserted in the eighteenth century. Indeed, even when the terms are read as distinct, their 
meanings are not necessarily fixed: within a single intellectual community authors might agree 
that there exists a distinction between affectus and affectio while assigning these terms 
opposite poles when defining it.  
Also important to consider are the terms that commonly collocate with affectus and 
affectio that have the potential to change or nuance their meaning. Significant in this regard are 
dispositio and passio, as they can indicate whether affectus and affectio are being used to 
express emotions meanings (passio) or something different, such as intention or character 
(dispositio), although both can signify terminology of virtues and vices. Similarly, we must 
account for the way the meanings of affectus and affectio are potentially altered when they are 
compounded with other terms signifying part of the body/mind/spirit continuum, such as 
animi, animae, mentis, and cordis. In both cases, chronological and intellectual context will 
strongly influence meaning. The Cartesian mind moves and influences the body in ways 
                                                     
4 E.g. AUGUSTINE, De civitate Dei [civ.] 9.4: ‘Duae sunt sententiae philosophorum de his animi motibus, quae Graeci 
πάθη, nostri autem quidam, sicut Cicero, perturbationes, quidam affectiones uel affectus, quidam uero, sicut iste 
[sc. Apuleius], de Graeco expressius passiones uocant. Has ergo perturbationes siue affectiones siue passiones…’ 
(ed. B. DOMBART and A. KALB, CCSL 47, Turnhout 1955, p. 251, our emphasis). 
unimaginable to Platonic psychology; natural initial emotional movements of the Stoic passions 
become potential Christian sins. 
Our aim in this article, then, is to flag some of the dangers involved in thinking of 
affectus and affectio as necessarily coextensive with modern ‘emotions’, while also identifying 
instances and patterns in their usage that do seem to be related to histories of the passions, 
affects, sensibilities, and desires. In the process, our survey ranges widely through Latin writings 
of the classical, medieval, and early modern eras, into the eighteenth century, offering a series 
of snapshots of usage differentiated by author, period, and genre, rather than attempting to 
draw a coherent narrative arc. 
 
Classical and Late-Antique Affectio and Affectus 
We begin with Cicero, who was highly influential in initiating a philosophical vocabulary for the 
Latin tradition generally and for the emotions in particular.5 He asks: ‘For what is courage 
except a disposition of the soul enduring in facing danger both in work and pain and far from all 
fear?’ (Quae est enim alia fortitudo nisi animi adfectio cum in adeundo periculo et in labore ac 
dolore patiens tum procul ab omni metu?) (CICERO, Tusculanae disputationes [Tusc.] 5.41).6 
Cicero (as often) joins adfectio to animi (mind’ or ‘soul’), making theories of mind relevant to 
interpretation: for example, is an affectio a quality of the whole soul or merely of part of it, 
perhaps the intellect or will? The terms are related to bodily actions and states (labore ac 
dolore patiens), virtues (fortitudo), and paradigmatic classical emotions (metus, dolor).7 
Therefore decoding them necessitates forays into questions of sensation, volition, and 
cognition, and moral, medical, and psychological theories. We wonder whether the ‘disposition’ 
denoted by adfectio is an inclination, disturbance, passion, or fixed habit (inclinatio, 
perturbatio, passio, habitus), all concepts related to affectus/affectio with distinguished 
                                                     
5 For the latter, see M. GRAVER, Cicero on the Emotions: ‘Tusculan Disputations’ 3 and 4, Chicago 2002. 
6 For all classical texts and editions, see http://latin.packhum.org/browse [Accessed 24 August, 2015].  
7 On classical emotions, see e.g. D. KONSTAN, The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical 
Literature, Toronto 2006; R. KASTER, Emotion, Restraint and Community in Ancient Rome, New York 2005; W. 
FORTENBAUGH, Aristotle on Emotion: A Contribution to Philosophical Psychology, Rhetoric, Poetics, Politics and Ethics, 
2nd edn, London 2003. 
philosophical pedigrees.8 We see that ‘courage’ is an animi adfectio, connecting affectio to 
virtue theory. In the Stoic frame of virtue as apatheia, fortitudo is absence of fear. Since fear is 
an emotion, Cicero’s animi adfectio may not be an emotion term.9 But if we reject Stoic 
passionless sages, adfectio could return to the emotion fold. If metriopatheia is allowed, 
patiens might define not simply unemotional endurance but instead moderated emotional 
engagement, and dolor might admit the possibility of controlled ‘grief’ rather than emotional 
pain.10 Different contexts generate varied semantic terrain for affectio/affectus, offering rich 
and sometimes incommensurable concepts of affectivity. 
A glance at the Thesaurus Linguae Latinae begins to map this field.11 Affectus is primarily 
passive, commonly glossed as διάθεσις (‘disposition’, as in Tusc. 5.41 above), ἦθος (‘character’) 
or πάθος (‘quality’). It often denotes some mental, volitional, or psychic movement caused by 
an external action, moving towards terms like morbus or dolor (‘illness’ or ‘pain’/‘suffering’) and 
negative near-synonyms vitium and morbus animi (‘defect’ and ‘illness of mind/soul’). The 
theme of mental or physical movement continues in related terms including impetus, impulsus, 
motus animi, commotio, perturbatio, and passio (urge, prompting, movement of the mind, 
agitation, upheaval, passion). It may also denote the effects of these movements, picking out 
phenomena often understood as emotions, desires, sensibilities, or virtues, e.g. amicitia, pietas, 
amor, sollicitudo, studium, caritas, and appetitum (friendship, respect, love, disquiet, 
eagerness, natural affection [στοργή], desire). Such movements are cognitive or volitional but 
need not involve active rational reasoning; affectus is regularly contrasted with rational 
judgment, argument, or proof (ratio, iudicium, fides, probatio, argumentum). The semantic 
range of affectus indicates in nuce how classical and late-antique theories of ‘emotional’ 
experience join moral, psychological, rhetorical, and medical theories. 
Affectio overlaps closely with affectus. Movements of the mind remain prominent: 
associated terms include commotio animi, motus animi, intentio mentis. When understanding 
                                                     
8 CICERO, Tusc. 4.38-4.55; SENECA, De Ira 2.1-4.  
9 For Stoics on apatheia, see M. GRAVER, Stoicism and Emotion, Chicago 2007. 
10 Stoic fear might be an animi adfectio, since the disposition could include passionate states and virtuous 
apathetic ones. 
11 See TLL s.v. affectus/affectio. Here we merely summarise the rich detail, highlighting the most significant 
meanings for histories of ‘emotions’.  
such movements as changes, Christian writers argue that God admits no adfectiones (e.g. 
LACTANTIUS, De Ira Dei 4,2 INGREMEAU, SC 289). Affectio likewise includes the volitional states 
amor, dilectio, caritas, pietas, animus, cupiditas and character dispositions, perceptions, and 
feelings, linking terms such as sensus, consuetudo, cultus, and constitutio. Cicero contrasts it 
with habitus and studium (De inventione [Inv.] 1.36). Habitus is a ‘constant and absolute 
completedness of mind or body...for example perception of virtue, or some art or knowledge’; 
affectio is a ‘temporary change in mind or body due to some cause, for example joy, desire, 
fear, annoyance, sickness, weakness’; studium is ‘the mind ardently and vehemently applied to 
some subject with great pleasure, for example interest in philosophy, poetry, geometry, or 
literature’.12 The Christian Neoplatonist Marius Victorinus later argues that a studium may itself 
be either a habitus or an affectio, emphasising the temporary and incomplete, if still emotional, 
nature of the mental or physical change denoted by affectio (Explanationes in Ciceronem 
Rhetoricam I,25,95-129 IPPOLITO, CCSL 132). 
Generic differences often explain emphases, although different genres cross-fertilise 
each other.13 Affectio/affectus unsurprisingly denote bodily states and illnesses in medical 
texts, while philosophical considerations inform these distinctions.14 Astrological writers use 
both terms to signify relationships between celestial bodies and their supposed effects, 
inflecting philosophical discussions of fate.15 This meaning also appears in rhetorical, 
philosophical and historiographical texts probing how estimations of value, pleasure or 
enjoyment shape relationships.16 Thus the didactic poet Manilius uses affectus to speak of 
music delighting the ears, highlighting how affectio and affectus are linked to sense perception 
and the human capacity to relate to physical objects through ethical or affective judgments 
(MANILIUS, Astronomica 2.148). Drama, rhetoric and historiography push affectio/affectus 
                                                     
12 habitum autem [hunc] appellamus animi aut corporis constantem et absolutam aliqua in re perfectionem, ut 
virtutis aut artis alicuius perceptionem aut quamvis scientiam...Affectio est animi aut corporis ex tempore aliqua de 
causa commutatio, ut laetitia, cupiditas, metus, molestia, morbus, debilitas...studium est autem animi assidua et 
vehementer ad aliquam rem adplicata magna cum voluptate occupatio, ut philosophiae, poëticae, geometricae, 
litterarum. 
13 OLD s.v. affectio/affectus provides another attempt to categorise the texts cited here. 
14 CELSUS, de Medicina 4.26.5, 2.7.26; CICERO, Tusc. 4.30, 5.27. 
15 MANILIUS, Astronomica 1.875, 4.854; CICERO, de Divinatione 2.99 and de Fato 8. 
16 E.g. CICERO, Topica 68, 70, Tusc. 4.14; TACITUS, Annales 3.58. 
towards ‘desire’, ‘love’ and ‘sympathetic understanding’.17 Such genres also inform and are 
coloured by the ethical and rhetorical discourses discussed above (CICERO, Inv. 1.36) that define 
affectio/affectus as temporary emotional or ethical dispositions.18 
This connection between emotions and virtues pervades Christian texts. Sorabji has 
charted the move from Stoic potential emotions (principia proludentia affectibus which are not 
yet fully-fledged adfectūs: Sen. De ira 2.2.36) to potential vices.19 Enacting affectiones/affectūs 
becomes sinfully indulging in passiones. Augustine broadly follows this general move, but 
repeatedly downplays terminological differences (civ. 9.4-5 DOMBART & KALB, CCSL 47).20 
Speaking of ‘movements of the mind’ (animi motibus), he equates the Greek παθή, Cicero’s 
perturbationes, Seneca’s affectiones vel affectūs, and Apuleius’s passiones, which he thinks is 
closest to the Greek (civ. 9.4). This blurring of terms may partly be explained by his wider 
polemic harmonisation of Platonic, Peripatetic, and Stoic differences concerning virtue and 
apatheia or metriopatheia.21 Throughout, Augustine understands affectiones as emotional 
mental movements that everyone experiences and which may be subjugated to reason (civ. 
9.4-5). 
Emphasising mental movements advances Augustine’s arguments (against Platonists 
and Manicheans) that sinful passions arise from both the body and the soul (perturbatio, 
passio, affectibus pravis tamquam morbis et perturbationibus quatitur) (civ. 14.5-10 DOMBART & 
KALB, CCSL 48). Yet affectūs towards ‘love of the good and holy charity’ are virtues, affectiones 
that follow rectam rationem (civ. 14.9). These affectiones are contrasted with morbos and 
vitiosas passiones (civ. 14.9). They are properly human and God-given movements of the mind 
that impel Christians to God and the good (civ. 14.9). While Augustine can use affectio to refer 
                                                     
17 E.g. APULEIUS, Metamorphoses 3.22; OVID, Tristia 4.5.30; QUINTILLIAN, Institutio oratoria 1.2.15; STATIUS, Silvae 
5.pr.1; TACITUS, Agricola 30.5. 
18 E.g. CICERO, de Officiis 3.29, Tusc. 5.47; OVID, Metamorphoses 7,171, Tristia 4.3.32; SENECA, Epistulae morales ad 
Lucilium 59.1, Oedipus 207; QUINTILIAN, Declamationes minores 270, Institutio oratoria 5.12.9, 8.3.4. 
19 R. SORABJI, Emotions and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, Oxford 2000. 
20 G.J.P. O’DALY and A. ZUMKELLER, Affectus (passio, perturbatio), in Augustinus-Lexicon, ed. C.P. MAYER and E. 
FELDMANN, I, Basel, 1986, cols 166-180 analyses Augustine’s concept of emotion and its wider 
Christian/philosophical context in detail. 
21 CICERO, Tusc. 4.38-4.46. For parameters of this debate, see J. DILLON, Apatheia and Metriopatheia: Some 
Reflections on a Controversy in Later Greek Ethics in IDEM, The Golden Chain: Studies in the Development of 
Platonism and Christianity, Aldershot 1990, cap. VIII. S. KNUUTTILA, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, 
Oxford 2004 provides detailed analysis of significant authors. 
to badly directed affects and desires (civ. 14.10), more often passio or perturbatio are used. The 
piae caritatis adfectus remain in paradise (Gn litt 2,21,3 ZYCHA, CSEL 28; civ. 14.10 on the 
grander gaudium of paradise), and we hear nothing of ‘pious and loving passiones’. Despite 
Augustine’s repeated insistence that words are not concepts, the stage is set for later attempts 
to pin down definitions and distinctions more precisely. Throughout his account, we see the 
inseparability of ideas of emotion from moral theory and theological anthropology. This 
conjunction informs medieval and early modern uses of affectio and affectus. 
 
The Medieval World 
The development in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries of affective piety, which initiated the 
genre of texts of self-formation, and the emergence of scholasticism, attendant upon the rise of 
the universities, with its new approaches to knowledge helped to generate new meanings and 
distinctions between affectio and affectus. Authors of texts of self-formation, aiming to provide 
an understanding of how the human person can be shaped and approach nearer to God, and 
the scholastics, desiring to explain the universe from the celestial hierarchies down to the 
functions of the immaterial soul, developed an increasingly elaborate and refined terminology, 
and the treatment of emotional complexity was a feature of both developments. 
 
Richard of St Victor 
One of the key writers of the new affective piety and development of the interior homo in the 
twelfth century is Richard of St Victor (d. 1173). In his Beniamin minor (also known as De 
duodecim patriarchis), the terms affectus and affectio recur over fifty times. Exegeting the 
wives of the Old Testament patriarch Jacob, Rachel and Leah, as equal gifts from God, Richard 
defines Rachel as ‘ratio qua discernamus’ ([the power of] reason by which we discern) and Leah 
as ‘affectio qua diligamus’ ([the power of] affection by which we love).22 Richard argues that 
while the spiritual senses (‘spirituales sensūs’) arise from reason, the action of affection 
produces ordered emotions (‘ordinati affectūs’).23 That these ‘affectūs’ accord with ‘emotions’ 
                                                     
22 RICHARD OF ST VICTOR, De duodecim patriarchis siue Beniamin minor, ed. J. CHÂTILLON, M. DUCHET-SUCHAUX, and J. 
LONGÈRE, Paris 1997, cap. 3, p. 96. 
23 RICHARD OF ST VICTOR, De duodecim patriarchis siue Beniamin minor, cap. 3, p. 96. 
is made clear when Richard numbers the ‘affectūs principales’ as seven, naming them as ‘spes 
uidelicet et timor, gaudium et dolor, odium, amor et pudor’ (hope and fear, joy and sorrow, 
hatred, love and shame)24—terms we associate with ‘emotions’. Richard’s exegesis of these 
‘affectūs’ as the children of Leah (who signified ‘affectio’), indicates that he views affectūs as 
individual emotions arising from the broader emotional activity made possible by affectio.25 
This usage seems consonant with Richard’s De statu interioris hominis, where Richard 
lists individual emotional states—‘sic amor, sic timor, sic spes vel dolor’ (love, fear, hope and 
sorrow)—and adds ‘and any such other emotion’ (‘sic ceterorum quilibet affectus’).26 Equally, 
when Richard suggests that we should actively shape the nature of our affectio by studiously 
applying ourselves to love what we know ought to be loved and to love less what is less worthy 
of our love, affectio would appear to signify an overarching emotional capacity.  
However, published texts of medieval works can lead us astray when seeking the history 
of these keywords, as the apparatus criticus of Jean Ribaillier’s edition of Richard’s De statu 
interioris hominis reveals. Medieval scribes copying out texts over subsequent centuries seem 
to have applied their own understanding of Medieval Latin emotions terminology, either 
through confusion over distinctions between affectus and affectio, or because they viewed the 
two terms as synonymous. In manuscripts, the title of Cap. IX, ‘De inquietudine humani 
affectus’ has the variant ‘humane affectionis’,27 while Richard’s discussion in Cap. XXXIV of the 
‘quatuor principales affectiones in corde’ (the four principal affective states of the heart, listed 
as love and hate, joy and sorrow), finds ‘affectiones’ alternatively supplied as ‘affectus 
affectiones’ and ‘affectus et affectiones’.28 When Richard lists attributes of which the will is the 
‘imperator et dominus’, these being the thoughts, feelings, appetites, and senses (‘tot 
cogitationum, tot affectionum, appetituum, sensuum’), scribes give the variant reading 
‘affectuum’ for ‘affectionum’ in eleven manuscripts and ‘affectuum aut affectionum’ in a 
                                                     
24 Ibid., cap. 7, p. 108; see also cap. 36, p. 190. 
25 See similarly cap. 7, p. 108: ‘Principales ergo affectus septem sunt, qui ab una animi affectione alternatim 
surgunt’, and Richard’s exegesis of Adam and Eve in his Mysticae adnotationes in Psalmos, CXXI: ‘Per Adam 
intellige rationem, per Evam accipe affectionem. Duo sunt, intellectus et affectus’ (PL 196, 363B MIGNE), where 
affectus appears to be the sub-definition of affectio.  
26 J. RIBAILLIER, Richard de Saint-Victor, De statu interioris hominis, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du 
Moyen Âge, 42, 1967, pp. 7-128, (p. 72). 
27 De statu interioris hominis’, p. 71.  
28 Ibid., p. 102. 
twelfth.29 This should remind us that the meanings of these terms were never consistently 
apprehended across the medieval period, and that medieval scribes had the power, as do 
modern editors and translators, to ‘create’ the emotions terminology of the Middle Ages. 
 
John of La Rochelle 
John of La Rochelle (1200-1245) was a Franciscan theologian and earlier contemporary of the 
Dominican Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). John grappled in his Summa de anima (c. 1235-
1236)30 with the sorts of definitions to which Aquinas, with his intricate categorization of the 
passiones animae, would provide better known solutions.  
To John, a passio most simply signifies receptivity; for this reason, he argues, species in 
the soul (which is receptive of grace) are rightly known as its passiones.31 However, a passion 
can also be understood as something received with untoward violence (immoderata ui) 
whereby one disposition (disposicio) is altered into another, especially its opposite, and John 
gives as examples the alteration of one thought (cogitacio) or one affective state (affectio) into 
another.32 Elsewhere in the text, passio is used to describe physiological states and processes, 
such as hunger and thirst, or the dilation and constriction of the heart.33 
John then analyses the powers of the soul according to three authorities: Augustine, 
John Damascene’s seventh-century De fide orthodoxa, and the De anima of Avicenna (Ibn-
Sīnā).34 Concluding his analysis of Augustine, John argues that Augustine defines four affectūs 
that arise from the concupiscible and irascible powers of the soul, these being joy (gaudium), 
hope (spes), sorrow (tristicia), and fear (timor).35 Affectūs here would seem to indicate 
individual emotions. Yet in his discussion of Damascene not long after, John describes as 
                                                     
29 Ibid., p. 81. 
30 JEAN DE LA ROCHELLE, Summa de anima: Texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables, ed. J.G BOUGEROL, Paris 
1995, p. 12. 
31 Ibid. p. 149, lines 42-46. 
32 Ibid. p. 149, lines 46-49. 
33 Ibid., p. 222, line 47; p. 262, lines 128-130. 
34 The De anima comprised the Latin translation of the first part of Avicenna’s eleventh-century Kitâb Al-Shifâ’, and 
it circulated in the West from the late twelfth century: see D.N. HASSE, Avicenna’s ‘De anima’ in the Latin West: The 
Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul, 1160-1300, London 2000.  
35 JEAN DE LA ROCHELLE, Summa de anima, p. 196, lines 5-8. 
affectiones a similar division of affective states (concupiscencia, leticia, timor, tristicia) arising 
from the same affective powers (the concupiscible and irascible).36 
A more precise definition of one of our key terms appears in John’s discussion of 
Avicenna, where he notes that ‘Affectio uero est motus interior consequens secundum 
apprehensionem boni uel mali’ (An affection is an interior movement consequent upon the 
apprehension of good or evil). This produces the usual quartet of joy (gaudium seu leticia), 
sorrow (dolor seu tristicia), hope (cupiditas seu spes), and fear (metus seu timor), indicating that 
affectio here signifies ‘emotion’.37 Yet we also see here the contributing role of apprehension 
(thought) to the creation of affection.  
John had earlier pointed out the role of thought in the creation of an emotional state in 
Damascene’s approach, in his description of agonia (a species of timor, fear) as ‘suspicio futuri 
mali, uel affectus ex existimacione futuri mali, aut est existimacio futuri mali secundum 
disposicionem proximam’.38 That is, the emotion (affectio) of agonia arises either because 
thought (existimacio) of a future evil produces an emotional disposition (affectus) towards it, or 
because those disposed (having a disposicio) towards fear of future evil are prone to such 
thoughts. This analysis (which models Peripatetic and Stoic approaches to emotions) underlines 
the interaction of thought and disposition in the creation of emotion. John’s relation of 
Avicenna’s discussion of affective aptitude continues this argument, noting that while humans 
are equally capable of experiencing any given affectio (for example, sorrow or joy), individuals 
will be more inclined (apciores) to particular ones.39 The primary factor influencing this aptitude 
will be one’s disposicio apprehensionis, that is, one’s imaginative faculty and its impact on the 
body,40 although one’s habitual experience (disposicio uirtutis motiue…ex consuetudine 
exercicii) and humoral composition (disposicio complexionis secundum spiritus corporeos et 
sanguinem et humores) also play a part. 
                                                     
36 Ibid. p. 208, lines 21-25. 
37 Ibid., p. 263, lines 6-10. 
38 Ibid., p. 211, lines 8-10. 
39 Ibid. p. 265, lines 1-4.  
40 Ibid., p. 263, lines 20-22: ‘Cum enim anima ymaginatur speciem aliquam boni uel mali et corroboratur in ea, 
statim materia corporalis recipit disposicionem habentem comparacionem ad illam’.  
From patristic writers such as Augustine and Jerome, the medieval West had inherited 
the meaning of affectus as a ‘disposition’ in a volitional or intentional sense.41 This usage 
continued, as, for example, in Heloise’s ethic of intention: ‘Non enim rei effectus sed efficientis 
affectus in crimine est’ (It is not the outcome of the deed, but the disposition / intention of the 
doer that renders it a sin).42 Yet as seen in the discussion of John’s Summa de anima, the terms 
disposicio and affectus were increasingly correlated through the Middle Ages in the context of 
emotions theory. A more precise definition of affectus in this context would be forthcoming in 
the hugely influential Prima secundae (c. 1271) of Thomas Aquinas’s Summa theologiae. 
 
Thomas Aquinas and the Summa theologiae 
In the Prima secundae of the Summa theologiae, the terminological discussion about passio 
features in Quaestio 22, articles 1, 2, and 3.43 Article 1 provides the reader with an initial double 
definition of passio. Passio is any state that is ‘received’ or endured by an agent—it is an 
ontological category and the counterpart to action. In its narrowest sense, passio involves the 
subject being drawn by its sensitive appetite to something that contradicts its nature and 
therefore entails a bodily alteration for the worse.44 A passion proper therefore results in 
qualitative motion-as-change in a body. In this sense, there is no essential passion of the soul 
proper, but of man as a composite of body and soul. 
 Article 2 offers a more general definition of passio and affectio/affectus by addressing 
the question: do passions belong to the soul’s appetitive power (sensitive appetite or the will), 
or to its apprehensive power (cognition)? Augustine’s plurivocal definition of a passion as a 
                                                     
41 On Augustine’s use of affectus in a dispositional sense, see O’DALY and ZUMKELLER, Affectus (passio, perturbatio), 
I, col. 179. See VAN ’T SPIJKER, ‘Ad commovendos affectus’, pp. 219-220 on Jerome’s understanding of the biblical use 
of ‘affectus’ (Psalm 72. 7: ‘affectus cordis’) as ‘dispositio’ and his translation of the Greek term for ‘dispositio’ 
(διάθεσις) as ‘affectus’. 
42 Letter Collection of Peter Abelard and Heloise, ed. D. LUSCOMBE, Oxford 2013, Letter 2, p. 136 (my trans.). 
Compare AUGUSTINE, civ., 16.5, CSCL 48, p. 505: ‘Merito autem malus punitur affectus, etiam cui non succedit 
effectus’. For affectus as ‘disposition’ in Abelard’s writings, see W. FLYNN, Abelard and Rhetoric: Widows and Virgins 
at the Paraclete, in Rethinking Abelard: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. B.S. HELLEMANS, Leiden, 2014, pp. 155-186 
(p. 156 and n. 6). 
43 THOMAS AQUINAS, Prima secundae in Summa theologiae, in Corpus Thomisticum, ed. E. ALARDON, University of 
Navarra, 2013 last accessed 14/08/15: http://www.corpusthomisticum.org. Subsequent references to the Summa 
theologiae will be abbreviated ST1a for Prima pars, ST 1a2ae for the Prima secundae. 
44 In this respect, ‘sadness’ is more a passion than joy. 
motion of the soul equated with affectio and affectus features in the sed contra, the refutation 
of the preliminary objections of this article. Aquinas interprets the Augustinian definition as an 
argument in favour of the appetitive rather than apprehensive nature of passio/affectus/ 
affectio, and agrees with Augustine. Passio, affectus, and affectio all express the operation of 
the appetitive power. 
 But is the appetite underpinning passio/ affectio/affectus sensitive, or intellectual (that 
is, volitional)? Article 3 answers by restating the definition from article 1: passions proper 
involve the sensitive appetite and transmutation in the body. The scriptural ‘passions’ of anger 
or pity ascribed to God or angels are therefore mere forms of accommodation, allowing human 
beings to understand disembodied, intellectual volitions. 
 Yet the Prima pars of the Summa suggests a possible distinction between affectus and 
affectiones, those quasi synonyms for Augustine. The Prima pars defines affectiones as the acts 
of the appetitive power, mediated (sensitive appetite) or not (the will). In this respect, 
passiones are a species of the more general affectiones. Aquinas relabels passiones in 
embodied creatures as affectiones in order to focus on them as results of an intentional 
process: it is inasmuch as they are the expression of an appetitive power (whose operation is 
mediated by the body and induces changes in the body) that passiones are affectiones. For 
purely spiritual creatures, such as angels, affectiones play the role that changes in the body 
played for embodied creatures: they testify to intentionality-as-process (unfolding in 
succession), the actualisation of which results in successive affectiones.45  
 There might be a slight difference between affectio as the actualisation of the appetitive 
power, and affectus, which seems to be the very ontological disposition that constitutes such 
appetitive power.46 Affectus denotes the (often spiritual, and in any case voluntary in that it 
engages the will) source of all affectiones-as-volitions. The spiritual connotation of affectus is 
noticeable in the Prima pars of the Summa, where affectus often denotes divine intentionality 
towards creatures—its paradigm is the affectus dilectionis, the love of God that created and 
                                                     
45 ST1a, Q.10, art.5, response. 
46 It is mostly in this sense of an original disposition at the source of the appetitive power and that can be 
subjected to rational will, that affectus is used in the Prima secundae. The permeability between affectus (as initial 
disposition) and affectiones (as its actualization) is important in the Prima secundae, so the distinction suggested 
here is not a hard and fast one.  
sustains the world.47 Affectus also denotes a spiritual form of human intentionality in man’s 
relation to God. It is this human affectus as natural intentionality towards the good that is the 
recipient of grace and the site of faith.48 However, the human affectus as tendency towards the 
good is often weak and can be hindered by the passiones of the sensitive appetite.49  
 
Early Modern Scholasticism: Passio, Affectus, Affectio, and Ethical Concerns 
The definitions of affectus, affectio, and passio in early modern scholastic textbooks testifies to 
growing ethical and theological concerns about human emotions and the best ways to 
discipline them. The question of their nature was inextricable from debates on free will and 
lapsarian anthropologies, those battlefields of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. 
The terminologies surveyed here highlight the scholastic effort to define precisely emotions in 
faculty psychology in order to better include them within the remit of ethics. These 
terminological debates thus reflect early modern attempts at redefining man as a conscious and 
morally responsible subject. These debates also illustrate the fusing of the classical tradition 
with the legacy of scholasticism—particularly that of Aquinas’s Prima secundae of the Summa 
theologiae. 
 Fully-fledged philosophical accounts of emotion featured in the Lutheran textbooks of 
the famous reformer Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560), while commentaries on the Summa 
remained standard scholastic textbooks in systematic theology throughout the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries on the Catholic side of the religious divide.50 This article also focuses on 
the commentary about Aquinas’s Quaestio 22 in the Prima secundae, in the posthumous 1628 
                                                     
47 The fundamental ontological role of love—the very form of divine intentionality—testifies once more to the 
discrepancy between our modern understanding of love as an ‘emotion’ and its much larger semantic valence in 
Aquinas’s system. Love is not only the primordial affectus which is the source of all others: it is the very expression 
of God’s will in the world, and a key concept in Thomas’s account of the Trinity—love is the proper name of the 
Holy God (ST1a. Q.37, art.1, response). 
48 ST2a2ae, Q.5, art 2, response. 
49 ST.1a, Q.113, art.1, ad. 1.  
50 See P. LÉCRIVAIN, La Somme théologique de Thomas d’Aquin aux xvie-xviiie siècles in Recherches de Science 
Religieuse, 3, 2003, pp. 397-427. Aquinas, who was explicitly granted the status of authority alongside Aristotle in 
the 1599 Jesuit Ratio studiorum, was crucial in the intellectual weaponry of the Counter-Reformation. Thus the 
Dominican Bartolomeo de Medina, a renowned representative of the Salamancan school of theology and the 
founding father of probabilism, concludes the very first section of his commentary on the Prima secundae with a 
refutation of the Reformed view of justification by faith alone: BARTOLOMEO DE MEDINA, Expositio in primam 
secundae angelici doctoris D. Thomae Aquinatis, Salamanca 1582, pp. 49-52. 
Ad primam secundae D. Thomae tractatus quinque theologici by Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), 
the leading theologian of the Jesuit order whose schools pervaded early modern Europe. 
Melanchthon’s textbooks and Suárez’s commentary emphasize the moral nature of emotions 
by consciously replacing passio with affectus or affectio. 
 
Philip Melanchthon: Dynamic Affectus and Bodily Passio 
Philip Melanchthon, the ‘Preceptor of Germany’, consistently used affectus instead of passio to 
mean emotions in his textbooks, thus highlighting the dynamism of emotions as acts rather 
than mere receptiveness. 
 In his 1547 textbook on dialectic, the Erotemata dialectics, Melanchthon classifies 
affectus under the category of ‘quality’, that is ‘a form by means of which a substance can move 
the senses’. The main qualities of substance include the three fonts of action: habitus (ἕξις), 
affectus (πάθη), and naturales potentiae (δύναμις).51 Melanchthon distinguishes affectus 
proper from mere sensations of pleasure and pain which are physical passiones occurring in the 
body’s muscles and nerves.52 By contrast, the affectus cordi are motions excited by cognition. 
Melanchthon then distinguishes two types of affectus cordi proper: lasting ones—love, hate, 
pity, and envy—are similar to habits. Others are sudden motions similar to the physical 
passiones: the sudden anger of Ajax strikes his heart like a painful blow to the body.53 
Melanchthon’s textbook on rhetoric, the 1542 Elementa rhetorices, introduced this dichotomy. 
There affectus is one of the sources of dialectical invention: the positive and negative affective 
responses to moral propriety (honestum) or shamefulness (turpide) from the audience helps 
the orator find the right arguments to trigger such responses. The two types of affectus 
identified in the dialectic are labeled as ‘ethical’ (ἦθος) and ‘pathetic’ (πάθος) in the rhetoric. 
                                                     
51 PHILIP MELANCHTHON, Erotemata dialectices, in Opera quae supersunt omnia in Corpus Reformatorum, 13, series 1, 
ed. K.G. BRETSCHNEIDER and H.E. BINDSEIL, Halle 1834-1860 (1846), pp. 535-536. I adopt the standard abbreviation of 
CR for subsequent references to the Corpus Reformatorum. 
52 ‘Passion (...) means the reception of action and its nervous effects in the patient (...). Sudden affects, which are 
strikes on the heart, belong here’; MELANCHTHON, Erotemata, CR 13, pp. 555-56. 
53 MELANCHTHON, Erotemata, CR 13, p. 543. 
Ethical affectus are ‘lighter’ (leniores) and deserve a softer (blandior) expression than pathetic 
affectus which are more violent (vehementiores) and best suited to a tragic expression.54  
 Affectus therefore occupies a middle ground between habits (ἕξις in ontological terms, 
ἦθος in rhetorical ones) and the passions. The good affectus or habits (στοργαί), defined as 
‘natural goodwill’ (naturalis benevolentia), instantiate this position. The natural, rather than 
acquired, love of parents for their offspring, infused in men by God, is one such good affectus 
for Melanchton, who notes that these affectūs would be purer if human nature was not 
depraved. That is why good teaching is necessary to regulate and moderate them.55  
 Ethics provide that very discipline: Melanchthon returns to the definition of affectus in 
his textbooks on ethics, the 1538 Philosophiae moralis epitome and the 1550 Ethicae doctrinae 
elementa. Melanchthon repeatedly defines affectūs proper as the appetites or motions of the 
senses and the will.56 Against the Stoic view that affects are opinions to be altogether uprooted, 
Melanchthon locates affectus in the heart as the seat of the appetitive power.57 Good affectūs 
(στοργαί) are God’s gift and foundations of virtues: uprooting them is a sin. However, the 
definition of affectus in the Ethicae elementa reasserts the role of cognition: affectūs are 
conscious appetites. Yet the experience of joy or sadness as these appetites are satisfied or not 
amounts to affectus-as-passio, that is, the physical experience of pain or pleasure which follows 
from the heart’s constriction and dilatation.58 Melanchthon takes literally the definition of 
affectus as motion of the heart: affectus is one of the two causes of the heart’s motion, 
alongside pulse.59 It is also in a physical, medical sense that he uses affectio—very rarely, 
compared with affectus—to denote the bodily reverberations of emotions.60  
 
Francisco Suárez: Affectus, not Passio—A Lesson in Lexicographical Propriety 
                                                     
54 MELANCHTHON, Elementa rhetorices, CR 13, p. 454. 
55 MELANCHTHON, Erotemata, CR 13, p. 540. 
56 MELANCHTHON, Philosophiae moralis epitome, CR 17 (1851), pp. 50-11. 
57 MELANCHTHON, Epitome, CR 17, p.42; Erotemata, CR 13, p. 712. 
58 MELANCHTHON, Ethicae doctrinae elementa, CR 17, p. 202. 
59 MELANCHTHON, De partibus et motibus cordis, CR 17, p. 953. 
60 See, for example, MELANCHTHON, Declamatio de praefatione in Homerum, CR 11 (1843), p. 402. However, affectus 
is also used in a medical sense in Declamatio de studiis linguae graecae, CR 11, p. 863. 
In a somewhat similar fashion, Suárez’s commentary on the Prima secundae provides a clear 
terminological statement on the respective use of passio and affectus, and posits the greater 
propriety of the term affectus over passio to describe the action of the sensitive appetite. His 
Ad primam secundae D. Thomae tractatus quinque theologici (Lyon, 1628) reorganizes the 
subject-matter of the Prima secundae into a series of treatises and disputations. The 
terminological discussion features in the first disputation, ‘On the passions’ of the fourth 
treatise ‘On those acts that we call passions, and also on habits (...)’. In the first section, 
intended to define the passio animae, Suarez launches his attack against the term passio in 
favour of affectus. Aquinas’s definition is too wide, according to him, as it includes any change 
(mutatio), even one that perfects the subject, although passio is often used to denote a change 
that corrupts the subject. Suarez then cites John Damascene’s definition: ‘passion is the motion 
in the senses of the appetitive power due to the imagination of good or evil’, and states that 
while this term and its definition are commonplace among philosophers, yet this definition is 
not properly that of passio—which stresses the physical change resulting from such a motion 
(physica alteratio)—but that of affectus, which denotes the immanent act of one’s appetite, 
and is therefore the rightful Latin term. 
 Suarez explains that the Apostles (Paul) and Church Fathers (Chrysostom, Augustine, 
and Jerome) referred to the cause (affectus) when naming its effects (passiones). In so doing, 
they emphasized the importance of flesh and incarnation in human sin: it is because affectus 
can move bodily humours and prompt passiones as bodily changes that humans are susceptible 
to sin. Yet he also rejects the Stoic usurpation of the term passio to denote solely those motions 
of the sensitive appetite that contradict one’s nature—an usurpation made by Aquinas who 
followed Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations and Seneca’s De ira. Any motion of the sensitive 
appetite resulting in bodily change deserves the label passio: the Aristotelians, Damascene, and 
Augustine used the word in that sense.  
 Finally, Suarez also rejects the distinction between the acts and the passiones of the 
sensitive appetite, according to which the acts would be elicited by the appetite proper, 
whereas the passiones would be mere affectiones generated by something else and impacting 
the sensitive appetite, such as pleasure, pain, etc. He ascribes this view to Henry of Ghent and 
Duns Scotus, and refutes it by stating that there is no pure passivity or receptiveness in the vital 
appetite (affectus), whose very acts are the passiones he has just defined. Suárez’s definitions 
of affectus and passio highlight the dynamism of emotions and lays the foundation for their 
renewed integration into ethics: all affectūs are vital appetites, whose actualization triggers the 
bodily changes known as passiones.61 
 
Affectus/ affectio in the Early Modern Republic of Letters 
While the Republic of Letters was a permeable, supra-confessional, and ‘interdisciplinary’ 
space, united in its use of Latin, our ‘affect’ terms are fluid in their application across the 
various learned discourses in different times, places, and genres. But were they talking about 
‘emotions’? 
 
‘Conditions’ of the Body and Mind 
From the late Renaissance and through the seventeenth century, learned physicians fretted 
over what they perceived to be an epidemic of ‘hypochondriac melancholy’.62 The title page of 
Munich physician Malachias Geiger’s Microcosmus hypochondriacus sive de melancholia 
hypochondriaca tractatus … (1652)63 announces that it will explain the ‘treatment of this 
affectus, to the extent that it is treatable from the triple font of care, hygiene, surgery, and 
drugs.’ It might be tempting to gloss affectus as ‘mental illness’ but the condition in question 
was believed to be a complex of bodily as well as emotional and/or psychiatric problems.64 It 
must be conceded that there is a disproportionately high number of early modern medical 
dissertations devoted to the ‘atrabilious’/ ‘melancholic’ / ‘hypochondriac’ / ‘mirachial’ affectus 
or affectio, which might suggest an intensifying emotional colour to these words. However, we 
                                                     
61 SUÁREZ, Tractatus quinque theologici, tract. 4, disp. 1, sect. 1, pp. 329-30. 
62 See A. GOWLAND, The Problem of Renaissance Melancholy, Past and Present, 191, 2006, pp. 77-120. 
63 See Y. HASKELL, The Anatomy of Hypochondria: Malachias Geiger's Microcosmus Hypochondriacus (Munich, 
1652), in IDEM ed., Diseases of the Imagination and Imaginary Disease in the Early Modern Period, Turnhout 2011, 
pp. 271-295. 
64 In the preface to his posthumous medical work, De morbis & affectibus mulierum (Lyon, 1619), on the 
‘“diseases” and “affects” of women’, Montpellier physician JEAN DE VARANDA says that the morbi of women are 
properly those that afflict women and men alike, whereas the affectūs are those specific to women (in this 
instance) by dint of their ‘distinctive temperament’ [proprii temperamenti] or anatomy. It is important to note that 
these affectūs of women are not limited to mental or emotional conditions.  
continue to find others on, for example, the affectus of the eyes, the affectus of rabies, of old 
age, and of pregnant women.65 In a medical context, affectus might best be translated 
‘condition’, with perhaps an enhanced sense of ‘complaint’ or ‘affliction’.66  
 
From ‘Intent’ to ‘Affection’ 
A distinct sense of affectus and affectio is retained from Roman law in early modern legal 
dissertations, for example Johann Kaspar Pflaume, De affectione juridica (1668), Ernst Friedrich 
Schröter, De affectione (1669), and Johann Alexander Schegk, Dissertatio juridica de affectione 
(1690).67 Yet the meaning of ‘will’ or ‘intent’ deriving from Ulpian (150-250 CE) had already 
acquired a more emotional hue in later Roman jurisprudence and could signify brotherly love 
between soldiers and fatherly love for children in the Middle Ages.68 In a philosophical 
dissertation, Konrad Böttner (praeses), David Ebersbach (respondens), De mutuo parentum 
atque liberorum affectu (1700), the same emotional destination is arrived at via a different 
linguistic route: affectus is said to encompass all six of Descartes’s basic passions (sc. from OLD 
affectus (1)), but here the ‘genus is taken for the species, synechdochically’, i.e. as ‘love’, the 
affectus that moves us most. 
 
Emotion by Any Other Name? 
Hendrik de Roy’s De affectibus animi dissertatio (1650) is one of several early modern 
dissertations bearing this title or variations of it. Philosopher and Professor of medicine at 
Utrecht, Regius was in dialogue, and in some matters disagreement, with Descartes. In the 
present work he offers the following definition of affectus: ‘I say [it is] a “thought”, because it is 
an action we carry out when attending to a thing, and I say “it is connected with a stronger 
movement of the spirits of the brain, which affects the mind and body more strongly”’ (p. 4). In 
                                                     
65 Such titles occur in the preceding century, too. Definitions of affectus in Renaissance learned medicine are 
beyond the scope of this essay. See, for example, I. MACLEAN, Logic, Signs and Nature in the Renaissance: The Case 
of Learned Medicine, Cambridge 2007, p. 261, for affectus as diathesis, i.e. predisposition to a condition. 
66 Cf. OLD affectus1 (2): ‘(w. corporis; or alone) A physical state or condition, esp. pathological’. 
67 OLD affectio (5) ‘A purpose, intention’; and affectus1 (8) ‘An intention, purpose’. 
68 See F. PEDERSEN, Marriage Disputes in Medieval England, London 2003, pp. 156-157, in the context of medieval 
affectio maritalis, which originally signified ‘intent to marry’, yet later acquired the additional sense of ‘loving 
bond’. See also J.T. NOONAN, Marital affection in the canonists, Studia Gratiana, 12, 1967, pp. 479-509 (p. 482). 
emphasizing the mental nature of the affectus, Regius demurs from Descartes’ distinction 
between passions and actions in the Passions de l’âme, a watershed in the genre, but is still 
essentially talking about ‘emotions’.69 And if Franz Benno Fugger claims in his Disputatio 
philosophica de affectibus animi (1623) that ‘the passiones, which are also affectūs and 
perturbationes animae, are treated by theologians, moral philosophers, physicians, orators, 
poets, each in their different ways’, the core sense of affectus as ‘emotion’ is shared across all 
these disciplines in the early modern period—with or without the addition of animi or animae. 
So in the eighth book of De eloquentia sacra et humana (1618), ‘De affectibus’, Nicolas Caussin, 
S.J.70 tells us that the affectūs are implanted in us by God, with the soul; if he attempted to 
eradicate them, as the Stoics enjoin, a man would be left ‘without vigour, sensation, and even 
worse, astorgos [heartless]’. The affectus are like the wings of a bird that carry the soul on its 
destined path, as ‘helpers and forerunners of the virtues’. While nodding to the taxonomies of 
Aristotle, Cicero, and Aquinas, Caussin gives detailed attention here to the affectūs of love, 
hatred, anger, and pity. 
 
Special Affects 
While the basic inherited meanings of affectus—‘condition’, ‘intent’, ‘affection’, ‘emotion’—do 
not change significantly in the early modern Republic of Letters vis-à-vis earlier periods, there 
are changing understandings of what, exactly, constitutes an affectus qua ‘emotion’. Moreover, 
competing tendencies to simplification and proliferation of the affectūs may be observed.  
In the preface to his wide-ranging and influential musicological treatise, Musurgia 
Universalis (1650), Jesuit polymath, Athanasius Kircher writes that ‘through the sense of 
hearing we don’t merely excite all the animi passiones—mildness, love, anger, fear, pity, 
emulation, happiness, shame, gloominess … and an almost infinite number of affectūs 
immediately brought about in us by the sound of the voice—but we also quell and moderate 
them’ (Preface, p. 2, my emphasis). In Book 7, Chapter 6, he suggests that there are eight 
                                                     
69 See A.M. SCHMITTER, 17th and 18th Century Theories of Emotions, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Spring 2014 Edition), E.N. ZALTA ed., URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/emotions-
17th18th/ [last accessed 27/08/2015]. 
70 One of the most important seventeenth-century theorists of the passions, especially for his ‘Empire of Reason 
over the Passions’, the fourth tome of his Cour saincte (Holy Court: Paris, 1638). 
affectūs which music can especially express: ‘The first is love [amor]. The second is grief or 
lamentation [luctus seu planctus]. The third is happiness and exultation [laetitia & exultatio]. 
The fourth is rage and indignation [furor & indignatio]. The fifth is pity and tears [commiseratio 
& lacrymae]. The sixth is fear and suffering [timor & afflictio]. The seventh is confidence and 
boldness [praesumptio & audacia]. The eighth is wonder [admiratio]. All the other pathemata 
may easily be reduced to these’ (Vol. 1, p. 598). In Book 8, Chapter 8, §2, on the ‘various animi 
affectiones to which music inclines us’, Kircher compares the orator’s use of arguments and 
reasons to provoke the various ‘emotions’ (affectūs), to compel the audience’s assent, to the 
way music also, via the weaving of periods and varied arrangement of tones, moves our ‘mind’ 
(animum) wherever it wants. It moves our ‘soul’ (animam), however, via three ‘chief emotions’ 
(affectūs generales), namely ‘happiness’ (laetitia), ‘remission’/ ‘mildness’ (remissio), and ‘pity’ 
(misericordia), each subsuming several other affectūs. While shuffling, combining, if not coining 
new affectūs / ‘emotions’ (for example, timor & afflictio, remissio), Kircher does not offer new 
definitions of affectio and affectus per se and apparently uses these terms interchangeably.  
The university culture of the Germanic lands spawned an abundant literature on the 
passions or vices of learning in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.71 In this context, 
Martin Greim produced his Dissertatio philosophica de affectibus eruditorum (1695). Greim’s 
basic definition of affectus derives, he says, from Descartes, via Vossius, but he explores in this 
dissertation the special affectus of the learned, such as theologians’ zeal, the desire to broaden 
one’s studies and undertake journeys, and curiositas. We may detect a slippage, then, between 
the common early modern sense of affectus as something like ‘emotion’ towards something 
more like the modern English ‘passion’ as ‘obsession’. Likewise, Professor of theology and 
Church history at Geneva, Jean Alphonse Turrettin, De affectibus a veri studio abducentibus, 
oratio academica (1710), reviews the affectus that detract from our pursuit of truth, the proper 
end of our studies, which include sloth, greed and ambition, admiration and reverence for 
learned authorities, pride, partiality, and lust. Turretin’s list has as much of ‘vice’ as (modern) 
‘emotion’ about it. New understandings of affectus in the early modern Republic of Letters are 
                                                     
71 See, for example, S. KIVISTÖ, The Vices of Learning: Morality and Knowledge at Early Modern Universities, Leiden 
2014; P. HUMMEL, Moeurs érudites: Etude sur la micrologie litteraire (Allemagne, XVIe-XVIIIe siecles), Geneva 2002. 
to be sought not in explicit and linear refinements of scholastic definitions but rather in implicit 
and often idiosyncratic accommodations of older usages to early modern discursive contexts. 
 
Conclusion 
This study could not hope to be exhaustive: it remains provisional and preliminary, and we 
hope it will lay the foundations for more detailed studies of the crucial Latin keywords affectus 
and affectio in the premodern history of emotions. In general, we can conclude that while these 
terms need not denote concepts directly related to our modern understanding of emotions, 
they very often refer to individual states akin to emotions or to emotional capacities. Affectus 
and affectio also link these states and capacities (and hence the history of emotions) to wider 
concerns in literary, intellectual, and cultural history. Our survey suggests that while some 
authors used affectus and affectio largely interchangeably, others defined them separately, and 
related the terms to each other in ways significant to theology, philosophy, ethics, rhetoric, and 
medicine. We see no linear development of a concept here; rather, complex interplays between 
contemporary thought systems and beliefs and earlier aspects of the tradition produce 
distinctive concepts in different contexts. This points towards a methodological need to 
reconfigure ‘emotion’ itself in period terms embedded in their rich contexts. Our investigations 
have also highlighted other concepts that come into play for different authors in their uses of 
affectus and affectio, including character disposition, bodily sensations, inclinations (physical, 
mental, or volitional), and disturbances and passions. Since the ways in which emotions are 
constructed conceptually change over time, we need to (re)expand our vocabulary to capture 
the range of meanings implicated in the terms affectus and affectio and their associated 
physical, cognitive, and volitional components. The complex and contingent histories of affectus 
and affectio allow us an insight into the varied, obsolete, or strikingly modern ways in 
which human beings made sense of the diversity of human emotional experience before the 
term ‘emotion’. 
